Neuroeconomic measures of social decision-making across the lifespan. by Zhu, Lusha et al.
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
Neuroeconomic measures of social decision-making across the lifespan.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9mn0k90w
Authors
Zhu, Lusha
Walsh, Daniel
Hsu, Ming
Publication Date
2012
DOI
10.3389/fnins.2012.00128
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 21 September 2012
doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00128
Neuroeconomic measures of social decision-making
across the lifespan
Lusha Zhu1, DanielWalsh2,3 and Ming Hsu2,3*
1 Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Roanoke, VA, USA
2 Neuroeconomics Laboratory, Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
3 HelenWills Neuroscience Institute, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Edited by:
Kerstin Preuschoff, École
Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne,
Switzerland
Reviewed by:
Geoffrey Schoenbaum, University of
Maryland School of Medicine, USA
BerndWeber,
Rheinische-Friedrich-Wilhelms
Universität, Germany
*Correspondence:
Ming Hsu, Haas School of Business,
University of California, 2220
Piedmont Avenue, Berkeley, CA, USA.
e-mail: mhsu@haas.berkeley.edu
Social and decision-making deficits are often the first symptoms of a striking number of
neurodegenerative disorders associated with aging.These includes not only disorders that
directly impact dopamine and basal ganglia, such as Parkinson’s disorder, but also degen-
eration in which multiple neural pathways are affected over the course of normal aging.
The impact of such deficits can be dramatic, as in cases of financial fraud, which dispro-
portionately affect the elderly. Unlike memory and motor impairments, however, which are
readily recognized as symptoms of more serious underlying neurological conditions, social
and decision-making deficits often do not elicit comparable concern in the elderly. Further-
more, few behavioral measures exist to quantify these deficits, due in part to our limited
knowledge of the core cognitive components or their neurobiological substrates. Here
we probe age-related differences in decision-making using a game theory paradigm previ-
ously shown to dissociate contributions of basal ganglia and prefrontal regions to behavior.
Combined with computational modeling, we provide evidence that age-related changes in
elderly participants are driven primarily by an over-reliance in trial-and-error reinforcement
learning that does not take into account the strategic context, which may underlie cognitive
deficits that contribute to social vulnerability in elderly individuals.
Keywords: aging, game theory, reinforcement learning, strategic learning, neuroeconomics, decision neuroscience
INTRODUCTION
A widow responds to a telemarketing investment firm’s offer
of financial security. The firm convinces her to convert all her
assets to risky, liquid investments managed by the firm. Over the
course of a year, the firm provides near constant attention to the
widow, who, by the end of the year, had lost $800,000 (Starnes,
1996). Such crimes are unfortunately common. Although there
is widespread recognition of elderly fraud among both finan-
cial and legal scholars, and efforts to introduce legislation to
combat this problem (e.g., Smith, 2000), we know very little
about the specific sources of such vulnerability at the neurobi-
ological level. Unlike memory and motor impairments, which
are readily recognized as symptoms of more serious underly-
ing neurological conditions, decision-making deficits often do
not elicit comparable concern in the elderly (Denburg et al.,
2007). There are also few neuropsychological tools or biomark-
ers available to measure decision-making deficits, particularly
those that contain a social component such as susceptibility to
fraud.
Here we sought to probe age-related effects of an important
class of social behavior captured by economic games, and build
upon recent advances in understanding of the neural substrates
of value-based decision-making. Intuitively, efficient value-based
decision-making requires organisms to make decisions to obtain
rewards and avoid punishments that are present in the envi-
ronment (Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Rangel et al., 2008; Maia
and Frank, 2011). In the social domain, however, organisms also
need to anticipate and respond to actions of others competing or
cooperating for the same rewards.
Neurobiologically, there is much evidence that the capacity to
make appropriate value-based decisions depends critically upon
integrity of the nigrostriatal dopamininergic (DA) system and
frontostriatal circuits, which is well known to degenerate over
the course of aging (Bäckman and Farde, 2005). Furthermore,
there is growing consensus that the computational underpinnings
of these systems can be parsimoniously characterized by rein-
forcement learning (RL) theories of behavior (Sutton and Barto,
1981; Schultz et al., 1997). This synthesis of theory and data has
led to speculations that abnormalities observed in healthy older
adults is at least partially caused by age-related decreases in neu-
ronal number in these circuits, as well as a decreased number of
synapses in those neurons (Li et al., 2001; Li and Sikström, 2002;
Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007).
Despite this rapid progress, however, there has been limited
application of this formal framework to understand age-related
changes in value-based decision-making in the social domain.
Here, in addition to needing to learn about available rewards
and punishments in the environment, agents also need to antici-
pate and respond to cooperative or competitive actions of others
(Camerer, 2003; Lee, 2008). This requires the ability to behave
strategically, which has been the subject of intense study in the-
oretical biology and game theory (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998;
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Game theory provides a math-
ematically precise description of the social environment, thus
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allowing for quantitative modeling of behavior that can build
upon previous findings on reward learning (Fehr and Camerer,
2007; Lee, 2008).
An important insight of this literature is that standard RL
models provide an incomplete account of strategic learning. Indi-
viduals blindly exhibiting RL behavior in social and strategic
settings are essentially ignoring the fact that their behavior can
be exploited by others (Camerer, 2003; Hampton et al., 2008). In
contrast, another well-studied class of learning models, commonly
referred to as belief-based learning, requires players to form and
update first-order beliefs regarding the likelihood of future actions
of opponents through experience, and provides a tractable model
of social learning in relatively simple environments. Neurobio-
logically, there is converging evidence that social decision-making
depends upon a broader network of regions that project to the
striatum, in particular the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which
is widely thought to be intimately involved in “theory of mind”
critical for social cognition and strategic reasoning (Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Jackson et al., 2006; Saxe, 2006).
Results from our previous research has shown that this para-
digm engaged key components of the frontostriatal circuits, and
to dissociate their respective contributions to behavior (Zhu et al.,
2012). Specifically, using model-based fMRI, activity in the ventral
striatum was found to underlie standard model-free RL through
trial and error. In contrast, activity in the mPFC underlies more
cognitively sophisticated belief learning that involves forming and
responding to first-order beliefs about the actions of other individ-
uals. Based on these results, we hypothesize that the ability to make
advantageous social decisions would decline over age as a result
of decline in higher-order cognitive functions that we believe to
be crucial for complex social decision-making. Furthermore, we
hypothesized that the differences in behavior can be captured by
key parameters in the computational model across age cohorts.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
We compare results from 30 young subjects (16 female, mean
age 23.3± 4.6 years) from University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, and 29 elderly subjects (14 female, mean age
64.1± 5.4 years) recruited from: (1) local flyers and bulletins in
the Berkeley community, (2) online forums such as Craigslist, and
(3) Berkeley Retirement Center (Table 1). All elderly subjects were
tested on the mini-mental status exam and self-reported to be
healthy and with no significant neurological issues.
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
We used the “Patent Race” game, first studied experimentally by
Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000), and most recently used in our
previous neuroimaging study. This game is simple in motivation
but rich in the strategic nuances and the patterns of behavior that it
can generate (Zhu et al., 2012). In the game, two opposing players
are randomly matched from a large pool of players at the begin-
ning of each round and compete for a prize by choosing how much
to invest (in integer amounts) from their respective endowments.
The player who invests more wins the prize, while the other loses.
In the event of a tie, neither player wins the prize. Players keep the
part of their endowment that is not invested.
Table 1 | Demographic information of participants.
Age group Young Elderly
Mean age 23.3 64.1
(S.D) (4.6) (5.4)
N 30 29
(# Female) (16) (17)
Mean year education 14.4 15.0
(S.D) (1.1) (0.9)
Estimated WAIS-R IQ 109
(S.D) (9.2)
WCST% correct 68.3
(S.D.) (14.4)
WCST% perseverative errors 11.7
(S.D) (6.9)
In the particular payoff structure that we use, the prize size is
10, and players are of two types: Strong and Weak. The Strong
player has five units of endowment, and can invest between 0 and
5 units in integer amounts, whereas the Weak player has four units
to invest, and can invest between 0 and 4 units (Figure 1). Fur-
thermore, to reduce cognitive burden associated with playing this
relatively complex game, we used a new interface first introduced
in Zhu et al. (2012). This interface replaced the standard matrix
form representation of the game that contains 60 elements with
one that directly reflects the logic of the game.
PROCEDURE
Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were given instructions
and quiz to ensure the understanding of the experiment. Partici-
pants played two stages of 80 rounds each of strong and weak roles
(counterbalanced). Opponents’ choices were drawn from a pool of
16 young adults who participated in an earlier session at Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. We ran subjects separately
to allow us to pair players against a common distribution of oppo-
nents. Previous sessions comparing “live” sessions and “non-live”
sessions show that young adults do not differ significantly across
treatments (Zhu et al., 2012). All subjects were fully informed of
the purposes of the research and were free to withdraw without
penalty. Elderly participants further completed psychometric tests
for IQ (Shipley Institute of Living Scale) and executive functioning
(Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, WCST).
COMPUTATIONAL MODELING
To quantitatively compute the mapping from the stimulus inputs
to the behavioral observations, we used the “experience-weighted
average”(EWA) model first introduced by Camerer and Ho (1999).
This model embeds both RL and belief learning, two of the most
widely used approaches to studying learning in competitive games.
These two learning rules differ with regards to the information
that subjects use to update action values. Intuitively, at the end of
each round, the subject receives two pieces of information – the
received rewards in the form of payoffs, and how much the oppo-
nent invested. For example, consider two rounds where the subject
chose 5, but where the opponent chose 0 in one round and 4 in the
other. In both cases, the subject’s received payoff is 10. However,
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FIGURE 1 | Patent Race Game. (A)Two players are randomly
matched from a large pool of players at the beginning of each round
and (B) compete for a prize by choosing an investment (in integer
amounts) from their respective endowments. (C)The player who
invests more wins the prize and the other loses. In the event of a tie,
both lose the prize. Players keep the part of their endowment that is
not invested. In the particular payoff structure of this game, the prize
size is 10, and players are of two types: Strong and Weak. The Strong
player has five units to invest, whereas the Weak player has four units
to invest.
in the former the subject could have earned more by investing less,
with the optimal investment being 1. In the latter case, however,
the subject cannot improve by investing any other amount.
Under RL, players are assumed to ignore the actions of the
opponent, and as a result treat both cases as equivalent. On the
other hand, belief learning assumes that players, either directly or
indirectly depending on the particular interpretation, include this
information in updating of action values (Cheung and Friedman,
1997; Camerer, 2003). The hybrid EWA model provides a para-
metric account of the weighting between the two learning rules, as
well as capturing how the past experiences depreciate over time,
both of which we will study in our data.
Formally, on each round, player i assigns a value V ki (t ), to each
strategy Ski in the strategy set Si =
{
S1i , S
2
i , . . . , S
k
i
}
, (i.e., invest-
ment amount). They also come into the game with certain prior
beliefs N (0), which reflect either the result of logical deduction or
previous life experiences. Denote Si(t ) as the investment amount
by player i at period t, and s−i(t ) as the investment amount of the
opponent at period t, the evolution of V ki (t ) and N (t ) is governed
by three parameters and updates according to the following:
V ki (t ) =

φiN (t−1)V ki (t−1) + δipii
(
Ski , S−i(t )
)
N (t ) , if S
k
i 6= Si(t )
φiN (t−1)V ki (t−1) + pii
(
Ski , S−i(t )
)
N (t ) , if S
k
i = Si(t )
N (t ) = ρiN (t − 1) + 1
As discussed in Camerer and Ho (1999), the three parameters
capture qualitatively distinct aspects of the learning process. First,
two of the parameters describe distinct notions of “experience”:
pre-game experience (or prior beliefs) and in-game experience.
Updating of the former (pre-game prior beliefs) is controlled by
the parameter ρi , such that a large value of ρi leads prior beliefs to
wear off quickly. On the other hand, updating of in-game adap-
tation – that is, responsiveness to actual experience during the
game – is captured via the parameter ϕi , where smaller values
imply greater weight placed on recent game experience. Finally,
the weight between reinforcement and belief learning is captured
by the parameter δi , which reduces to pure RL when δi=0, and to
pure belief learning model when δi=1.
To convert latent values V ki (t ) to choice probabilities, we
assume that the probability of player i playing Ski follows a softmax
distributionPki (t − 1) = exp
(
λ • vki (t )
)
/
∑L
l = 1 exp
(
λ • vki (t )
)
,
where λ is a measurement of subjects’ sensitivity to differences in
latent values (Camerer and Ho, 1999; Hsu et al., 2005). Using
initial values N (0) and V ki (t ) calculated from first period data
(Roth and Erev, 1995; Ho et al., 2008), we performed maximum
likelihood estimation at the individual level for both young and
elderly cohorts using a grid search over a large range of values for
all free parameters. That is, we maximized for each subject the
log-likelihood function
∑
t log
(
P si(t )i (t )
)
Standard errors were
estimated through a jackknife procedure (Camerer and Ho, 1999;
Zhu et al., 2012).
RESULTS
Our primary hypothesis is that elderly adults will exhibit slower
adaptation in strategic learning as compared to young adults. That
is, elderly adults will be less responsive to the actions of opponents
in terms of choice behavior. Furthermore, using our computa-
tional paradigm, we aim to distinguish between contributions
of three non-mutually exclusive computational accounts of any
observed age-related changes. First, we test whether older adults
employ less belief-based learning, and rely more upon simpler RL.
This would suggest that behavioral differences are caused by not
taking a complete account of possible information in the decision
context. Second, we test the hypothesis that older adults may be
less sensitive to recent in-game experiences. This will be reflected
in the estimated values for parameterϕ, and can intuitively capture
the notion that older adults are more“sluggish”in their adjustment
process (Kovalchik et al., 2005). Third, we test whether older adults
exhibit stronger pre-game prior beliefs, captured by the parameter
ρ, which would suggest that they are more “stubborn” in the sense
that their pre-game prior belief decays slower. These hypotheses
and a discussion of the different parameters are summarized in
Table 3.
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Table 2 | Comparison of Nash equilibrium prediction with the
empirical frequencies from young and elderly cohorts.
Role Investment Equilibrium
prediction (%)
Empirical distribution
Young (%) Elderly (%)
Strong 0 0 1 1
1 20 18 12
2 0 10 16
3 20 11 29
4 0 16 22
5 40 45 21
Weak 0 40 49 39
1 0 3 13
2 20 6 7
3 0 13 11
4 20 27 30
MODEL-FREE MEASURES
We begin with simple model-free comparisons of choice behavior
across age groups. Table 2 presents the empirical frequencies of
choices for each age group separated by player role. In order to
provide a benchmark for such comparison, we also include Nash
equilibrium choice probability predictions. The unique Nash equi-
librium prediction is that strong players should invest five 60% of
the time, one and three 20% of the time respectively, and weak
players invest zero 60% of the time, two or four 20% of the time.
As shown in Table 2, young subjects on average were reasonably
close to the Nash equilibrium prediction with the exception of
overinvesting 4 and underinvesting 3 as strong players, whereas
the distribution of choices made by elderly strong subjects were
further from Nash equilibrium prediction, with more evenly dis-
tributed choice over investing 2, 3, 4, and 5. Yet as weak players,
both elderly and young subjects overinvested 0 and underinvested
4. However, elderly subjects also overinvested 1, which is the itera-
tively dominated strategy for the weak role. A test of the proportion
of deviation showed that play from elderly cohort’s deviation from
Nash equilibrium significant more than did the young cohort
(p< 0.01).
To examine the “stickiness” of choices between successive
rounds, we computed the instances where participants switched
investment levels versus those where they did not. This gives us an
index of the proportion of rounds in which participants switched
strategies, versus those rounds in which they stayed (Figure 2).
We found that young subjects on average repeated investment in
44% of the choices over the course of the experiment, which is
remarkably similar to the Nash equilibrium prediction. In con-
trast, we found that elderly subjects repeated previous investments
at a much higher rate (60%), and significantly greater than more
often than young adults (p< 0.05).
MODEL-BASED MEASURES
To provide a mechanistic account of the differences as measured
using the model-free measures, we next fitted choice behavior
of our participants using the EWA model. First, we compared
FIGURE 2 | Comparison of probabilities of “staying” across different
age groups. Dashed line indicates Nash equilibrium predicted probability of
repeating the same investment.
the mean goodness of fit of the model across both cohorts. A
significant difference may suggest that comparisons of estimated
parameters are biased due to different explanatory powers of the
model. We found, however, that the mean log-likelihood values
did not differ significantly between the young and old cohorts
(Table 3, p> 0.2). This suggests that our computational model is
able to capture trial-by-trial variations in behavior at a similar rate
for both cohorts.
Next, we compared the mean values of the individual-level
parameter estimates (Table 3). We found that the mean estimates
for parameter δwas significantly lower for the elderly as compared
to the young (0.48 for young, 0.28 for elderly, p< 0.05), indicating
that the elderly on average employ less belief-based strategy, and
more reinforcement. This is in line with the findings through fMRI
that there may exist significant tissue loss in gray matter volume in
mPFC, which is indicated to be involved in belief-based learning
in our previous study (Zhu et al., 2012).
In contrast, we found that mean estimates for both types of dis-
count rates did not differ significantly between young and elderly
cohorts. Both young and elderly cohorts were estimated to have a
similar value of φ (0.95 for the young; 0.89 for the elderly, p> 0.1),
suggesting that both groups responded smoothly to past in-game
experience. Similarly, both groups also discounted prior-game
beliefs, captured by parameter ρ, at approximately similar levels
(p> 0.1, Table 3). Neither finding can be explained by differences
in the learning environment as both cohorts faced the same pool
of opponents.
Motivated by findings in the aging literature that aging increases
variability of behavioral responses (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2010),
we next investigated individual differences in the learning para-
meters using our model. We therefore compared the empirical
cumulative distributions of the model fit and parameter estimates
across the cohorts. We found that the distribution of the model
fits of the two cohorts, as measured by the log-likelihood value, is
distributed similarly, such that there is no indication of increased
variance or clustering of the elderly cohort (Figure 3A). Similarly,
we found that the two discounting parameters are also similarly
distributed across age cohorts. That is, there was no indication of
increased variance in either of the discounting parameter estimates
(Figures 3C,D).
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Table 3 | EWA parameters and their interpretations, as well as parameter estimates from young and old cohorts.
Model
estimates
Parameter
interpretation
Young adults1 Old adults1 T -test p-value2 K–S test p-value2
LL Log-likelihood value 90.4 (5.67) 79.3 (8.26) 0.27 0.56
δ Degree of belief-based learning exhibited. Larger
values mean more belief-based learning.
0.48 (0.041) 0.28 (0.075) 0.022 (0.065) 0.0016 (0.0047)
ρ Depreciation of the strength of before-game prior
beliefs. Larger values mean more depreciation.
0.86 (0.043) 0.83 (0.068) 0.74 (1.0) 0.59 (1.0)
ϕ Weight placed on most recent experience. Smaller
values mean more weight on freshest experience.
0.88 (0.031) 0.85 (0.050) 0.53 (1.0) 0.57 (1.0)
1Parentheses indicate SEM.
2Both t-test and Kolmogorov–Smirnov test p-values are given, with those corrected for multiple comparisons (three tests) given in parentheses.
FIGURE 3 | Empirical cumulative distributions of estimated
parameters across cohorts. (A) Log likelihood values measuring degree
of model fit, (B) parameter δ capturing the degree of belief learning,
(C) parameter ρ measuring depreciation of the strength of before-game
prior beliefs, and (D) parameter φ measuring weight placed on most
recent experience.
In contrast, the mediation parameter δ showed that behavior
in approximately half of the elderly cohort was driven entirely by
RL (Figure 3B). In light of the non-normal distribution of the δ
parameter estimates, we also included significance tests using the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K–S) test, a non-parametric, distribution-
free test that is robust to violations of normality (Table 3). We
found that all results using the K–S test are consistent with those
using the t -test, and show highly significant differences in the
δ parameters between age cohorts (p< 0.001). Interestingly, the
remaining elderly cohort appear to be distributed similarly to the
young adults, as can be seen by the upper half of the distrib-
ution (Figure 3B). There was, however, no indication that this
group of pure reinforcement learners differed on other dimen-
sions. Surprisingly, we found no differences in either demographic
or other model estimates for these two groups. The only measure
that approached significance was the value of ρ. The low δ group
had a slightly higher mean ρ (0.95) compared to the high δ group
(0.70), which is significant at the p< 0.1 level. This lack of dif-
ferentiation, however, may well be due to a lack of power in our
sample given the relatively modest sample size and restricted range
of age for the elderly cohort.
DISCUSSION
We spend much of our lives devoted to the accumulation of finan-
cial and social prosperity, and often with much success. To take just
one measure, the median net worth of a 65-year-old American in
2007 is more than double that of a 40 year old (Bucks et al., 2009).
For many, however, such wealth comes at a vulnerable time when
the cognitive and neurological apparatus that made this possible is
beginning to break down (Plassman et al., 2008). This vulnerability
can be attributed in part to a decline in the ability to make deci-
sions that take into account the appropriate cost-benefit tradeoffs.
Often these decisions take on a social dimension, where the elderly
appear particularly vulnerable. For example, it is well known that
the elderly are disproportionate targets of fraud across the world,
and constitute a conservatively estimated 30% of all fraud victims
in the United States (Templeton and Kirkman, 2007; Bucks et al.,
2009).
An understanding of the neurocognitive substrates of these
vulnerabilities therefore depends upon the availability of neu-
ropsychological tools that can be used to probe and characterize
such decision-making deficits, particularly those that contain a
social component such as susceptibility to fraud. This work makes
two contributions toward this goal. First, we show our novel
social learning paradigm was able to probe behavioral differ-
ences between cohorts, as well as individual differences within
cohorts. We found that, in contrast to young adults, learning
in about half of the elderly adults is driven primarily by RL.
Future studies can explore the degree to which such changes
are present in other social and non-social settings that require
higher-order cognition, such as cooperative interactions (King-
Casas et al., 2005; Chang et al., 2011), or those involving explicit
task structure (Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011; Simon and Daw,
2011). Second, using a well-established computational model of
strategic learning, we were able to dissociate between two possible
sources of the observed differences. Previous accounts have largely
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focused on qualitative descriptions of “sluggishness”of adjustment
of behavior. However, such a behavior can be a result of either
(1) an inability to integrate new information into one’s reward
expectations by discounting previous experiences, captured by
the two different discounting parameters, or (2) an attenuation
of the ability to extract or integrate information beyond the
received rewards and punishments. We show that the behavior
is primarily driven by the latter, and in particular an attenua-
tion of the ability to observe or integrate actions of others or
counterfactual outcomes. In contrast, elderly individuals did not
show significant differences in two types of discounting of past
experiences.
More broadly, our results potentially shed light on contradic-
tory findings in previous psychological and economic studies of
age-related effects in relation to social behavior. In particular, a
number of studies have suggested a decline in the ability of theory
of mind with normal aging (McKinnon and Moscovitch, 2007;
Slessor et al., 2007). Yet others found that older adults actually
performed better than younger adults, even in the face of possible
decline in many forms of cognitive processing (Happé et al., 1998;
Grossmann et al., 2010). Using a behavioral economic approach
similar to ours, Kovalchik et al. (2005) compared the ability of
strategic reasoning between the young and healthy elderly sub-
jects using the so-called “p-beauty contest.” This task has been
widely used in previous behavioral studies using traditional under-
graduate subjects as well as non-standard populations such as
business executives and portfolio managers (Nagel, 1995; Duffy
and Nagel, 1997). Surprisingly, they similarly found no significant
difference between the healthy elderly (mean age 82) and young
undergraduate participants.
Combined with our results, however, these results suggests
that the diminished reliance on mentalization and/or counter-
factual information to dynamically update behavior may reflect
core changes in the cognitive processing of social information
that occurs over the aging process. This is as opposed to strategic
reasoning, which refers to the static inferential process of guess-
ing what others will do without any prior contractual agreement,
which may well be preserved during aging. This hypothesis is
consistent with previous findings of behavioral deficits in elderly
patients in the“Iowa Gambling Task”(IGT; Bechara et al., 2000), as
well with what is known about degeneration of the dopaminergic
circuits and mPFC that supports value-based decision-making. In
particular, longitudinal studies have found frontal lobes suffered
the most drastic loss of volume as assessed through MRI (Resnick
et al., 2003).
In contrast, we speculate that static reasoning capacities in the
elderly may be partially preserved by reallocation of processing
resources from other brain regions. Such compensatory processes
at the neural level have been found across a variety of cognitive
functions, including episodic retrieval and visual perceptual atten-
tion, and which occur even in the face of global declines in neural
integrity (Davis et al., 2008). For example, there is abundant evi-
dence that older adults compensate for declines in bottom-up
sensory processing by over-recruitment of top-down processes
mediated by PFC (Davis et al., 2008; Dennis and Cabeza, 2008).
In the case of social cognitive functioning, there is substan-
tial evidence that, during development, the so-called “mentalizing
system” – consisting of the anterior mPFC, the posterior superior
temporal sulcus at the temporoparietal junction (pSTS/TPJ), and
the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) – undergo substantial changes
in their functional response to social information such as mental
states (Paus, 2005; Blakemore, 2008; Burnett et al., 2009). Ado-
lescents have been shown, for example, to exhibit greater activity
within the mPFC than do adults in social cognition tasks (Bur-
nett et al., 2009). In contrast, we know much less about how
neural responses change over adulthood in the social cognition
and behavior (Castelli et al., 2010; Beadle et al., 2012; Moran
et al., 2012), and whether they might have compensatory func-
tions that have been documented for other cognitive functions. A
more complete account of these age-related changes, however, is
only possible with a proper characterization of the computational
and structural integrity of the underlying neural systems and their
interactions.
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